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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN.
Edited by Lucy Kramer Cohen. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1960. Pp. xvii, 505. $12.50.
One of the more articulate and original proponents of the approach
to law known as "functional jurisprudence" was Felix S. Cohen.
His productive career covered less than 25 years from the time he
received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard (at age 22) until his
death at the age of 46.1 During most of that period, Cohen carried
on an active legal practice, for 14 years in the Department of the
Interior and thereafter in private practice. In the last six years of his
life, Cohen followed a weekly schedule of four days active practice
in Washington, one day teaching at City College in New York, one
day teaching at Yale-and one day to recover. In addition to his
demanding work schedules, he was able to produce prodigious quan-
tities of highest caliber legal writing. Although some of his scholar-
ship appeared in book form,2 the bulk of it was published as articles
and book reviews scattered through numerous publications.
Seven years after his death, Felix Cohen's widow has collected
and published a selection of his major papers, appropriately titled
The Legal Conscience. The work is divided into three parts--"Logic,
Law and Ethics," "The Indian's Quest for Justice" and "The Phil-
osophy of American Democracy," following an organization made by
Cohen shortly before his death. The collection is not exhaustive, but
it is sufficiently complete to afford vivid evidence of the depth and
breadth of his achievements.
Cohen's important jurisprudential papers are collected in the first
section. As a functionalist, he rejected the language of traditional
legal argument and opinions as justification for or explanation of
any rule of law, and focused his analysis on "the human meaning of
law."' The only legal questions he considered significant were (1)
"How do courts actually decide cases of a given kind?" and (2) "How
ought they to decide cases of a given kind?"' When a practitioner asks
the question "Is there a contract?", he seeks a prediction as to what
1. The biographical material in this review is taken from Biography of Felix
S. Cohen, 9 Rutg. L. Rev. 345 (1954).
2. Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (1933) ; Handbook of Federal Indian Law
(1941); Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (with Morris R. Cohen)
(1951).
3. P. 79.
4. Pp. 49-50.
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consequences a particular court will attach to a given fact situation.
Any data that can be shown to aid in the prediction, whether it relates
to previous decisions of the same or other judges, economic back-
ground, social class, work habits or digestion, are relevant; all other
information is without significance. Law to him is a problem of
social actualities.
To a judge, on the other hand, the question "Is there a contract?"
presents a moral issue. In effect, he is asking whether a given
transaction should be a contract. Prior cases will not answer this
for him, because every case is both similar to and different from
every other case. The problem of assigning relative importance to
to the similarities and dissimilarities is a problem of ethics, not
logic or science.
Cohen felt that these moral value judgments should be made and
criticized in terms of the consequences of the decision on the behavior
of those persons affected thereby. Science can aid in tracing out the
consequences of a specific course of conduct. However, there comes
"a point at which one must stop tracing the consequences of any
course and judge that in the light of all these consequences the course
in question is desirable or undesirable." Such a judgment can only be
made by application of basic ethical assumptions as to the "good
life."6 The main problem of present day lawyers and scholars, ac-
cording to Felix Cohen, is to bring the value assumptions underlying
all legal decisions into the open where they can be subjected to scru-
tiny and criticism.
In contrast to the proponents of realistic jurisprudence, Felix
Cohen believed ethical evaluation to be as necessary and imperative as
scientific investigation of consequences. His position is best sum-
marized in these words:
The collection of social facts without a selective criterion of
human values produces a horrid wilderness of useless statistics.
The relation between positive legal science and legal criticism
is not a relation of temporal priority, but of mutual dependence.
Legal criticism is empty without objective description of the
causes and consequences of legal decisions. Legal description is
blind without the guiding light of a theory of values. It is
through the union of objective legal science and a critical theory
5. P. 401.
6. Cohen's philosophy has been criticized for its failure to provide any method
for ascertainment of the fundamentals which make up the good life. See, e.g.,
Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience 68-70 (1959). It is a
defect which Cohen would undoubtedly acknowledge. Cohen, Ethical Systems and
Legal Ideals 227 (1933). He would probably reply to it with this quotation: "The
day is short and the task is great. It is not incumbent upon thee to complete the
whole work, but neither art thou free to neglect it."
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of social values that our understanding of the human significance
of law will be enriched7
Felix Cohen's most noteworthy achievements as a legal practitioner
centered about the protection and expansion of the rights of Amer-
ican Indians. While in government service, he assisted in the drafting
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, lent his talent and author-
ity to the successful effort to create the Indian Claims Commission 9
and strove for equitable solutions to the myriad, persistent problems
of Indian administration. As Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral in 1939, Cohen compiled a collection of Federal laws and treaties,
on the basis of which he prepared the Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, described by Felix Frankfurter as "the vademecum of all con-
cerned with its problems. ' 1o After returning to private practice,
Cohen appeared as general counsel to several Indian tribes and the
Association on American Indian Affairs in litigation securing to
Indians such basic rights as voting"' and participation in social
security programs. 12 It is fair to say that he has influenced, either
in person or through his writings, all significant Indian rights litiga-
tion since 1940.
The papers on Indian affairs reproduced in The Legal Conscience
demonstrate that he wrote not to convert the oppressors of the orig-
inal Americans but primarily to give the public generally, and es-
pecially those who considered themselves "friends" of the Indians, an
accurate understanding of the history and status of Indians and
Indian tribes. Cohen fought as hard to preserve those special at-
tributes of tribal status beneficial to the Indians as to relieve those
which were oppressive.
Three themes recur throughout these papers. The first is an effort
to show that the Indian in his tribe is not a child-like ward of the
Great White Father, but is instead a full citizen with certain rights
over and above those enjoyed by other citizens. These rights were
acquired by Indians, through statutes, treaties and contracts, in ex-
change for 95 per cent of the land in the public domain of the United
States Government. Cohen believed the land acquisitions were gener-
ally fair and equitable and that the rights acquired by the Indians
were and are of substantial benefit. He strove to protect against their
7. P. 76.
8. 48 Stat. 984 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 461.
9. See the Indian Claims Commission Act 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70.
10. P. xiii.
11. Trujillo v. Garley (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 1948, Unreported); Harrison v. Laveen,
67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948).
12. Acosta v. County of San Diego, 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1954) ; Arizona v. Hobby,
221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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destruction in the name of "assimilation" and to ensure that their
presence could not be mistakenly utilized as a justification for deny-
ing Indians the basic guarantees of citizenship.
The second theme is the notion that Indian tribes should enjoy the
largest possible measure of self-government. Although the right to
self-government has been recognized for more than 100 years, its
practical implementation has been frustrated by the use of deroga-
tory adjectives to describe the habits and activities of Indians, the
reluctance of Bureau of Indian Affairs officials to surrender their
authority, and procrastination. Cohen felt that Indians, no less than
their white brothers, should enjoy "the right to use experts when
their advice is wanted and the right to reject their advice when it
conflicts with purposes on which we are all our own experts." 13
Finally, he tried to familiarize all Americans with the scope and
nature of the Indians' contribution to the American way of life. In
politics, medicine, agriculture and even sports, Cohen felt "what is
distinctive about America is Indian through and through."'1 4 Although
there is a tendency to overstate the case here, there is no doubt that
the extent of the Indian contribution has been almost as great as our
ignorance of its influence.
In the final section of papers, Felix Cohen's philosophy and talents
are projected into the wider arena of the basic problems of dem-
ocracy. His concern with the rights of Indians was duplicated by
his efforts on behalf of aliens, Asiatics, peoples under colonial dom-
ination and the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Cohen fought for these
peoples, not for their sake alone, but for the sake of all free men:
If we fight for civil liberties for our side, we show that we believe
not in civil liberties but in our side. But when those of us who
were never Indians and never expect to be Indians fight for the
cause of Indian self-government, we are fighting for something
that is not limited by the accidents of race and creed and birth;
we are fighting for... the integrity and salvation of our own
souls. We are fighting for what Jefferson called the basic rights
of man. We are fighting for the last best hope of earth. And
these are causes that should carry us through many defeats.",
Up to the very day of his death,16 Felix Cohen wrote, practiced and
fought to ensure the continuance of what he felt was the American
way of life, not only for Americans but for the entire world. We
13. P. 313.
14. P. 316.
15. P. 314.
16. When he wrote the review of Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, which
is reprinted on pp. 481-84.
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must lament that death stilled his voice in 1953, since his advice
would be continually helpful in the present Cold War. But through
the immortality of his good works, Felix Cohen's memory and beliefs
remain with us. NEIL N. BERNSTEIN t
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISES, J. Malcolm Smith and
Cornelius P. Cotter, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1960.
Pp. 146. $5.00.
The major emphasis of the work is on emergency powers during
wartime, with lesser attention being accorded to emergencies gener-
ally involving a small area. In the latter category are emergencies
brought about by reason of droughts, earthquakes, fires, floods and
tornadoes. The normal procedure followed in such cases is that
Congress will authorize the president to take appropriate action after
declaring that an emergency exists.
The conclusion that the Constitution authorizes the use of emer-
gency powers is reached by the literature on the breadth of the in-
herent, residual, executive and war powers of the president. Hundreds
of cases involving the use of emergency powers during crises in the
three Administrations since 1933 are discussed by the authors, with
a few references to earlier precedents. However, the point of view
adopted is that precedent is unnecessary for the exercise of
"emergency" powers. Supporting this position are references to
numerous occasions where recent presidents have considered it nec-
essary to exercise an emergency power for the public good without
authority of law.
A separate chapter is devoted to the various legislative restraints
on the use of the emergency powers. Among these restraints are
requirements that the executive must report to Congress or to a
Congressional Committee. In some cases Congress may by concurrent
resolution check, modify or terminate an emergency program, while
in other instances, legislation may require inter-agency cooperation
in declaring and in meeting an emergency.
In the chapter devoted to judicial review, the authors agree that
self-preservation in time of war may require the violation of con-
stitutional rights of the individual. They quote with approval the
dictum of Chief Justice Hughes that "the war power of the federal
government . . . is a power to wage war successfully." Brief ref-
erence is made to the Milligan case following the Civil War, and to
the Schenck case with Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger
t A.B., University of Michigan, 1954; LL.B., Yale University, 1957. Member
of the District of Columbia and Wyoming bars.
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